The 40th anniversary of a relatively unknown massacre - Part 2

To gain proper understanding of the U.S. role in the massacre known today as the Gwangju Uprising, we have to understand the command structure of U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK - official name of South Korea) military forces.

The United Nations Command was formed in 1950 following North Korea's invasion of South Korea.  It remained the operational command structure for U.S. and ROK forces in South Korea until November of 1978.  At that time a new structure was formed.  The Combined Forces Command was stood up and since the day it was formed, a U.S. Army general has been its commander.

Does this mean that the military forces of South Korea are commanded by a U.S. general?  That would be the case if hostilities broke out on the Korean peninsula.  During peacetime, the two nation's militaries are supposed to be under their own operational control.

General Burwell B. Bell was the CFC/8th US Army commander from February of 2006 through June of 2008.  In 2012 he delivered a presentation at the Fourth Korea Foundation Global Seminar titled "The Evolution of Combined Forces Command."  In this presentation he said the following:

"So to reiterate, in 1978 two key defense commands were present in the ROK; The United Nations Command, focused on the Armistice Agreement, and the Combined Forces Command focused on preparing to defend South Korea should the north attack. Both were and are led by the same dual-hatted U.S. four star general. All South Korean and American Forces in South Korea were then, that is in 1978, placed under both the peacetime and potential wartime operational command and control of CFC, and, as such, the U.S. Commander. Because of this, South Korea's readiness to fight was ultimately the responsibility of the American Commander."

General John A. Wickham, Jr., was the CFC commander from July 1979 through June 1982.  He addresses this issue in regard to the Gwangju Uprising in his book Korea On The Brink: A Memoir of Political Intrigue and Military Crisis.

Pay attention to the fact that Richard Holbrooke wrote the foreword to this tome.

We know that the Chun regime sent military forces that were part of the Combined Forces Command to deal with the rioting in Gwangju.  This is what General Wickham wrote about that move in his book:

"We did know, however, that the ROK 20th and 30th Infantry Divisions, both of which had special training for riot control duty, were being withdrawn by Defense Minister Chu from CFC operational control. My permission to withdraw these units was neither sought nor required under the terms of the CFC agreement. Rhu told me that some units from the 20th Division were being dispatched patched by ROK authorities to the Kwangju area, but that the 20th Division's sion's troops had not yet been involved in suppressing the riots."

Tim Shorrock is a journalist who has written extensively and brilliantly on the Gwangju Uprising.  He wrote the following:

"Inside Gwangju itself, my stories had an electrifying effect. For years, its people had known that President Carter had agreed to release forces under the US-Korean joint command to put down their uprising. But until I obtained documents showing that Carter’s envoy in South Korea, William Gleysteen, had given advance approval to his plans to use military force against the students and workers swarming the streets in the spring of 1980, they had no idea of the depth of US complicity. The cables are now famously known in South Korea as the “Cherokee Documents” after the secret code name they were given at the time."

This is one of those cables.  Mr. Shorrock describes it as Mr. Gleysteen letting the South Korean government know that the U.S. "understood the need to maintain law and order and would not obstruct development of military contingency plans against the massive but peaceful demonstrations."

Tomorrow, we'll delve more deeply into what the U.S. knew, when it knew it, and what role it played in allowing the "Black Berets" to take part in crushing the uprising.